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In this paper I investigate, empirically, the outsourcing strategy by firms in French 
manufacturing industries. I particularly focus on the effect of the market thickness and of firm 
heterogeneity on the outsourcing strategy. For this purpose, I estimate a dynamic probit model 
where I link the decision to outsource to previous outsourcing behaviour. I am able to estimate 
the sunk entry costs incurred by the firms when adopting an outsourcing strategy. The results 
show that outsourcing is a persistent strategy adopted by more productive firms and larger ones. 
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This paper presents an empirical investigation of the outsourcing decision by manufacturing firms located 
in France. Recent years have witnessed an increase in the outsourcing strategy. A growing share of firms 
is contracting-out a wide range of activities related to their production process.   
The outsourcing strategy is related to a "Make or Buy" decision. A large body of the industrial organization 
literature has focused on this strategy and on the boundaries of the firm. This literature has put forward 
the role of asset specificity, specific investment, transaction costs and contract incompleteness 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986). While the traditional literature on outsourcing 
focuses on the relationship between two agents, new theoretical works try to endogenize the firm 
governance decision and to consider the possible interaction between firms’ decisions. For example, 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop a model of organization choice that introduces the possibility of 
interaction between the strategies of firms.  
Most of the existing empirical literature on outsourcing is based on the conclusions of the transaction 
costs theory and puts forward the determinant role of asset specificity and market conditions. Due to the 
limited availability of data, a large share of this empirical literature considers the particular case of an 
industry or a firm. Very few existing studies consider a cross-section of industries and only just recently 
studies at the firm level have been presented (Klein, 2005; Joskow, 2005).  
This paper aims to investigate the outsourcing strategy on the basis of a large panel of firms in sixteen 
manufacturing industries. It emphasizes the impact of the presence of sunk costs related to outsourcing, 
the relation between firm heterogeneity and the outsourcing behaviour, and the implication of upstream 
and downstream market thickness on outsourcing. The outsourcing strategy requires sunk entry costs 
related to the search and matching process, to monitoring, and to the enforcement of contracts. Because 
of the presence of these sunk costs, outsourcing is expected to be a persistent strategy. Moreover, firm 
heterogeneity will impact the outsourcing decision. More productive firms will choose outsourcing while 
the others will vertically integrate. The size of the market is expected to lower search costs and, hence, to 
favour the prevalence of the outsourcing strategy (Grossman and Helpman, 2002; McLaren, 2000). 
The empirical study is based on the annual firm survey covering all manufacturing firms with more than 20 
employees for the period 1990-2001 on the French metropolitan territory. 
This survey provides data on the firm’s production activity as well as on the firm’s characteristics. I am 
able to identify the firms that contract-out some of their activities and connect the outsourcing decision to 
the firm and industry characteristics. The results provide evidence on the persistence of the outsourcing 
strategy. Past outsourcing activity raises the probability of current outsourcing. They also show a 
significant causality between firm heterogeneity and the decision to outsource. More productive firms and 
larger ones have a higher probability of outsourcing. Finally, the size of the market seems to favour the 
establishment of outsourcing relationships. 
 
 1 Introduction
"We live in an age of Outsourcing" stated Grossman and Helpman (2005). A growing share
of ﬁrms is delegating tasks of the production process to independent suppliers. Further, a
wider range of tasks is contracted out. Today, not only low-technology manufacturing tasks
are outsourced but also services and even Research and Development (R&D) activities.
The outsourcing strategy is related to a "Make or Buy" decision. A large body of the indus-
trial organization literature has focused on the "Make or Buy" strategy and on the boundaries
of the ﬁrm. This literature has put forward the role of asset speciﬁcity, speciﬁc investment,
transaction costs and contract incompleteness (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Grossman and Hart,
1986). The industrial organization literature assumes that vertical integration imposes costs
of governance and is less efﬁcient than arm’s length transactions. However, because of asset
speciﬁcity (related to technology, human capital and localization) arm’s length transactions
are costly. The production of speciﬁc inputs, tailored to the speciﬁc needs of a ﬁnal good pro-
ducer, requires a speciﬁc investment from the supplier. Because of contract incompleteness,
the supplier fears to be held up and is thus tempted to realize a suboptimal level of invest-
ment.
Whilethetraditionalliteratureonoutsourcingfocusesontherelationshipbetweentwoagents,
new theoretical works try to endogenize the ﬁrm governance decision and to consider the
possible interaction between ﬁrms decisions. For example, Grossman and Helpman (2002)
develop a model of organization choice that introduces the possibility of interaction between
the strategies of ﬁrms. More precisely, a ﬁrm’s decision to outsource or to vertically integrate
depends on the ownership decision adopted by other ﬁrms. The model also shows that ﬁrms
are sensitive to market thickness, to the degree of competition, to search technologies and to
the sensitivity of the production to input speciﬁcities.
Most of the existing empirical literature on outsourcing is based on the conclusions of the
transaction costs theory and puts forward the determinant role of asset speciﬁcity and market
conditions. Due to the limited availability of data, a large share of this empirical literature
considers the particular case of an industry or a ﬁrm. Very few existing studies consider a
cross-section of industries and only just recently studies at the ﬁrm level have been presented
1(Klein, 2005; Joskow, 2005). For example, empirical analysis of the outsoucring decision at
the ﬁrm level have been presented by Girma and Görg (2004) for the United Kingdom (U.K.),
Swenson (2004) for the United States (U.S.), Kimura (2001) and Tomiura (2005) for Japanese
manufacturing ﬁrms and Holl (2004) and Díaz-Mora and Triguero (2007) for the Spain. De-
spite these contributions, evidence on the decision to outsourcing based on ﬁrm level data is
limited and many questions remain open for discussion and analysis.
This paper aims to investigate the outsourcing strategy on the basis of a large panel of
ﬁrms in sixteen manufacturing industries. It also emphasizes the impact of new elements
discussed by the theoretical literature, McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)
for example, such as the presence of sunk costs related to outsourcing, the relation between
ﬁrm heterogeneity and the outsourcing behavior, and the implication of upstream and down-
stream market thickness on outsourcing.
The outsourcing strategy requires sunk entry costs related to the search and matching pro-
cess, to monitoring, and to the enforcement of contracts. Because of the presence of these
sunk costs, outsourcing is expected to be a persistent strategy. In other words, ﬁrms with
previous outsourcing engagements are expected to maintain this strategy. Moreover, ﬁrm
heterogeneity will impact the outsourcing decision. More productive ﬁrms, the ones able to
incur the sunk costs, will choose outsourcing while the others will vertically integrate. Re-
garding the impact of the market thickness, I expect the size of the market to lower search
costs and, hence, to favor the prevalence of the outsourcing strategy (Grossman and Help-
man, 2002; McLaren, 2000).
These elements have been neglected by the empirical literature on outsourcing. To my knowl-
edge, no other study considers the determinant role of ﬁrm heterogeneity nor that of market
thickness on the outsourcing activity. The dynamic aspect of the outsourcing behavior has
been considered by very few studies that do not present conclusive results.
The empirical study, presented here, is based on the annual ﬁrm survey, "Enquête Annuelle
d’Entreprises" realized by the French ministry of industry, covering all manufacturing ﬁrms
with more than 20 employees for the period 1990-2001 on the French metropolitan territory.
This survey provides data on the ﬁrm’s production activity as well as on the ﬁrm’s character-
istics. I am able to identify the ﬁrms that contract-out some of their activities and connect the
2outsourcing decision to the ﬁrm and industry characteristics.
I estimate the sunk costs related to outsourcing by conditioning the current outsourcing de-
cision on the past outsourcing strategy. I measure ﬁrm heterogeneity by the total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), estimated by the Olley and Pakes (Olley and Pakes, 1996) methodology. I
measure the market thickness by the number of employees in upstream industries as well
as in the ﬁrm’s own industry. The thickness of the market at the ﬁrm’s industry level may
have two opposite effects on the outsourcing decision. On one hand, as the number of ﬁnal
good producers increases the demand for suppliers’ services increases and thus the entry by
independent suppliers will increase which facilitates the search and the matching process for
a ﬁnal good producer. On the other hand, the growth of the number of ﬁnal good producers
may have a crowding-out effect and the intensity of competition may discourage the entry by
ﬁnal good producers.
The results provide evidence on the persistence of the outsourcing strategy. Past outsourcing
activity raises the probability of current outsourcing. They also show a signiﬁcant causality
between ﬁrm heterogeneity and the decision to outsource. More productive ﬁrms and larger
ones have a higher probability of outsourcing. Finally, the size of the market seems to favor
the establishment of outsourcing relationships.
2 The Determinants of the Firms’ Outsourcing Strategy
The aim of this paper is the empirical analysis of the outsourcing decision with a special fo-
cus on sunk costs, ﬁrm heterogeneity and market thickness. I choose to emphasize the role
of these elements to provide evidence on the recent theoretical contributions to the analysis
of outsourcing, also because the dynamic aspect of the outsourcing strategy as well as the
signiﬁcance of sunk costs have been neglected by previous empirical work.
2.1 Sunk Entry Costs
As discussed in the introduction, the contracting-out of production engages the ﬁrm in ﬁxed
costs necessary for the search for a suitable partner, the establishment and enforcement of
3contracts, the monitoring of the partner’s work and the communication, and technology ex-
change with the partner. Some of these costs, related to the search for partners and to con-
tracts enforcement, are sunk. Some other costs, related to monitoring and communication
with partners may be subject to "learning-by-doing" effects. In this case, the accumulated
experience of a ﬁrm in dealing with its suppliers will reduce the costs of future transactions
with these suppliers or with new partners. The nature of these organizational costs suggests
that outsourcing must be a persistent strategy. Firms will want to avoid incurring the same
costs repeatedly, they will also want to beneﬁt from their accumulated experience.
A look at the data shows that transition in and out of outsourcing is relatively weak. Figure
1 presents the percentage of ﬁrms beginning to outsource as well as the percentage of ﬁrms
quitting the outsourcing strategy. The ﬁrst part of the ﬁgure presents the annual average and
shows that only 5% of ﬁrms initiate an outsourcing strategy while only 4% of ﬁrms engaged
in outsourcing relationships stop their outsourcing strategy. The second part presents the av-
erage of entry and exit in each industry and shows a certain degree of heterogeneity among
industries. The entry and exits percentages varies from around 8% in the wearing apparel
and wood and paper industries to around 2% in the energy sector.
In order to verify the signiﬁcance of sunk costs related to outsourcing and the persistence
of the outsourcing strategy I link the actual outsourcing decision to the past outsourcing be-
havior. I estimate a discrete choice model (probit) where the actual outsourcing status is
conditional on the previous outsourcing status. The sign, the signiﬁcance as well as the mag-
nitude of the coefﬁcient on the lagged outsourcing status will indicate the presence of sunk
costs and their relevance in the outsourcing decision.1
2.2 Firm Heterogeneity
The presence of signiﬁcant ﬁxed organizational costs raises the question of ﬁrm heterogene-
ity. From the literature on the export strategy, mainly the papers by Melitz (2003), Bernard
and Jensen (2004), and more recently on offshoring like the papers by Antras and Helpman
(2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2004), it has been established that, within an industry,
ﬁrms are not symmetric. Firms display several heterogenous characteristics like differences in
4scale, intensity in human capital, and productivity. This strand of the literature usually takes
productivity as a measure of ﬁrm heterogeneity and shows that the more productive ﬁrms
are the ones to engage in costly activities, exporting in the case of Melitz (2003) and Bernard
and Jensen (2004) or foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of Helpman et al. (2004).
I assume that organization costs are higher under outsourcing, in comparison to vertical in-
tegration, because of the necessity to search for a partner, to enforce contracts and to monitor
and exchange expertise with the partner.2 Figure 2 compares the cumulative curves of the
distribution of the ﬁxed costs of ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing relationships and ﬁrms that are
not for the years 1990, 1996 and 2001.3 Figure 2 shows that, in each of these years, the ﬁxed
costs of ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing are higher than those of ﬁrms without outsourcing re-
lationships.
If ﬁxed costs of organization are higher under outsourcing, I expect productivity to raise the
probability of outsourcing. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm is large it can spread the costs on a higher
number of produced units. Firm’s scale is therefore an additional determinant of the out-
sourcing decision. However, outsourcing gives small ﬁrms the opportunity to specialize and
to beneﬁt from scale effects. The impact of scale on the outsourcing decision is thus ambigu-
ous. Girma and Görg (2004) have analyzed the impact of scale on outsourcing, measured as
the amount of contracted-out industrial services, and have found a signiﬁcant positive effect
of scale on outsourcing. On the other hand, Díaz-Mora and Triguero (2007) have introduced
ﬁrm’s scale as a determinant of the choice of outsourcing and have found no signiﬁcant effect.
2.3 Market Thickness
The theory of transaction costs as well as that of property rights have, traditionally, consid-
ered the vertical relation between two agents. Both theories have neglected the possibility
that the decision by one agent might inﬂuence the decision by other agents. Recent literature,
like the papers by McLaren (2000) or Grossman and Helpman (2002), considers this interac-
tion and proposes new elements like market thickness, the openness to international tarde
and the degree of competition, as determinants of the "Make or Buy" decision.
5McLaren (2000) developed a model of vertical integration that investigates the impact of
globalization, or more precisely the openness to international trade, on the vertical integra-
tion decision. The McLaren (2000) model considers an industry with a certain number of ﬁnal
good producers requiring a specialized input. The inputs are produced by specialized sup-
pliers. Each pair of ﬁnal good producer and specialized supplier have two possibilities of
organizing their relationship: outsourcing (market transactions) or vertical integration. The
novelty of the McLaren (2000) model is that the organizational choice of each pair of ﬁrms
depends on the choice of the other pairs. Each specialized supplier has the outside option
of selling the input to an another ﬁnal good producer. This outside option increases with
the number of non-integrated ﬁnal good producers in the market. The equilibrium price re-
ceived by a specialized supplier depends on its ex-post bargaining power and increases with
its outside option. As the number of non-integrated ﬁnal good producers grows (a thicker
downstream market), the outside option of the specialized supplier as well as the attractive-
ness of market transactions increase. "([Specialized Supplier1] is more likely to be able to ﬁnd an
alternative interested buyer to use as a threat point, the more unintegrated ﬁrms there are among [ﬁnal
good producers-specialized suppliers] pairs 2 through n" (McLaren, 2000).
Grossman and Helpman (2002) offer a different view of the link between market thickness
and the vertical integration decision. The framework of this model is a world of incomplete
contracts, asset speciﬁcities and hold-up related risks, where a ﬁnal good producer needs to
obtain a speciﬁc input either through vertical integration or through arm’s length transac-
tions. In addition to hold-up and ex-post bargaining frictions, market transactions generate
search and matching costs. Non-integrated ﬁrms need to search for a suitable partner and
thus incur ﬁxed search costs. Market thickness will affect the viability and the prevalence of a
mode of organization through its impact on search costs. The expected proﬁt of a specialized
ﬁrm (ﬁnal good producer or supplier) increases with the number of specialized ﬁrms of the
other type because it raises the probability of a match. However, the expected proﬁt is re-
duced with the number of specialized ﬁrms of the same type because it increases search costs
and lowers the probability of a match.4 In the presence of increasing returns to matching, the
viability and prevalence of outsourcing will increase with the size of the industry.
6In a given industry, a ﬁrm’s decision to engage in outsourcing agreements is unambigu-
ously enhanced by the thickness of the market in the upstream industries. Nonetheless, it
can be positively or negatively affected by the thickness of the market in its own industry.
A higher number of ﬁrms in the same industry raises competition for supplier services but,
at the same time, will create incentives for suppliers to enter the market thus enlarging the
thickness of upstream industries. I analyze the link between market thickness and the out-
sourcing decision through the creation of three market thickness variables; one at the ﬁrm’s 4
digit industry level, one at the ﬁrm’s 2 digit industry level and a third one at the level of other
industries.
2.4 Other Determinants of Outsourcing
In addition to these elements, I consider other determinants of the outsourcing strategy. I take
into account the ﬁrm’s average wage assuming that a higher average wage increases the prob-
ability of outsourcing for two reasons. First, average wage may be an indicator of the ﬁrm’s
labor quality and thus of the ﬁrm’s productivity. Second, by contracting-out a certain amount
of production or a certain set of tasks, ﬁrms are able to reduce their variable costs (Abraham
and Taylor, 1996). Firms paying relatively high wages may therefore be more sensitive to the
possibility of reducing their wage bill and are, thus, more incline to contract-out production.
I also control for the presence of economies of scale at the industry level. I consider that, in
industries where the economies of scale are signiﬁcant, ﬁrms prefer to outsource in order to
capture the gains from the scale effects.
3 The Empirical Analysis





1 if Xit + Zit   N:(1   Outsourcingit 1) + it > 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
7where Outsourcingit represents the outsourcing status of ﬁrm i in year t, Xit is the vec-
tor of ﬁrm characteristics, Zit is the vector of industry characteristics and N represents the
sunk costs related to the entry into the outsourcing strategy.5 To avoid potential simultaneity
problems between the outsourcing status and the explanatory variable, especially the ﬁrm’s
characteristics, all independent variables are lagged one year. Hence, I estimate the following
equation:
Outsourcingit = Xit 1 + Zit 1 + Outsourcingit 1 + it (2)
The estimation of equation 2 raises several econometrical issues, especially the identiﬁca-
tion of the coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable. The persistence in the outsourcing
behavior, as in any binary choice setting, can arise from ﬁrm heterogeneity and serial corre-
lation in the error term it or from state dependence. In my speciﬁcation I control for a set of
ﬁrm characteristics that reﬂect ﬁrm heterogeneity, however, other ﬁrm ﬁxed effects may re-
main unobservable. If these ﬁrm unobservable characteristics affect the outsourcing decision
and if they have a permanent aspect their presence will induce a serial correlation in the error
term. In the presence of ﬁrm heterogeneity, the error term corresponds to: it = i +it where
i is a ﬁrm speciﬁc effect and it follows the distribution N(0;2
). The omission of these un-
observed variables and the ignorance of the serial correlation will attribute the persistence in
the outsourcing status to the presence of sunk costs and will lead to an overestimated coefﬁ-
cient on the lagged dependent variable. This corresponds to the "spurious state-dependence"
discussed by Heckman (1981a,c). The inclusion of ﬁrm speciﬁc dummies (the estimation of a
ﬁxed effect model), is usually used to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity. But, in the case of binary
choice models (probit or logit) with a limited time period the use of ﬁxed effects will lead to
an inconsistent estimation (Heckman, 1981b).
Furthermore, the estimation of a dynamic binary choice model in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity needs to take account of the "initial conditions problem". The ﬁrst observation:
Outsourcingi1 can have an impact on the entire path of outcomes and can not be treated as an
exogenous determinant of Outsourcingit (Heckman, 1981b; Wooldridge, 2001; Greene, 2003).
Heckman (1981b) presents a solution to the "initial conditions problem". It proposes to ap-
proximate the reduced form equation for the dependent variable’s initial value by a probit
function depending on pre-sample exogenous information:6
8Outourcingi1 = 1X
0
i1 + i (3)
where i = i+i1 is correlated with i, when  is different from zero7, and uncorrelated with
it fort  2. Heckman(1981b)suggeststhefollowingjointprobabilityof(Outsurcingi1:::Outsurcingit)
for ﬁrm i given i:
[(1X
0
i1 + i)(2Yi1   1)]
T Y
t=2
[(Xit + Zit + Yit 1 + i)(2Yit   1)] (4)
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and Y represents the de-
pendent variable (the outsourcing status). For a random sample of ﬁrms, the likelihood to be











[(Xit + Zit + Yit 1 + 
)(2Yit   1)]dF(
) (5)
where  = = and F is the distribution function of . Under the adopted normalization
 =
p
=(1   ),  being the correlation between the error term (it) in any two different





 for t;s = 2;::::T;t 6= s.
To obtain an estimate of the extent of state dependence I need to calculate the average
partial effect and the predicted probability ratio of the lagged depended variable. Just as
Wooldridge (2005) and Stewart (2007), I estimate two counter-factual probabilities that take
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(X0^  + Z0^ )
q
1   ^  (6)
The average partial effect corresponds to the difference between the two counter-factual
probabilities ( ^ Pj   ^ P0) while the predicted probability ratio corresponds to the ratio of the two
counter-factual probabilities ( ^ Pj= ^ P0).8
94 Data Description and Variables
The empirical analysis proposed in this paper is based on a data set derived from the annual
ﬁrm survey, "Enquête Annuelle d’Entreprises (EAE)", conducted by the French ministry of
industry. The "EAE" survey covers all ﬁrms with more than twenty employees. The data
set used here covers the period 1990-2001 and sixteen manufacturing sectors. The sectoral
classiﬁcation of ﬁrms follows the two digits French classiﬁcation "NAF36". The data set is an
unbalanced panel with a number of ﬁrms per year varying from 24506 ﬁrms in 1990 to 22053
ﬁrms in 2001. The "EAE" survey provides, among other, data on the productive activity of
ﬁrms: output, exports, number of employees, stock of ﬁxed capital, investment, value added,
use of intermediate inputs, the wage bill, and the outsourcing activity.9 Each ﬁrm reports the
amount of output contracted-out to other ﬁrms (in this case the ﬁrm acts as a buyer or an out-
sourcer). The availability of data on contracted-out production allows the construction of the
variable of interest, the ﬁrm’s outsourcing status. The availability of this information along
the data set period gives the possibility of linking the outsourcing decision in a certain year
to the previous outsourcing behavior.
One of the main focuses of this paper is the presence of entry ﬁxed costs related to the
outsourcing activity and the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the decision to engage in outsourc-
ing agreements. I associate ﬁrm heterogeneity with total factor productivity and scale. I have
measured scale by the number of employees and have estimated TFP, industry by industry
following the 2-digits classiﬁcation, by the semi-parametric methodology proposed by Olley
and Pakes (1996). This methodology controls for the simultaneity and selection problems as-
sociated with the estimation of TFP.
Another matter of interest for this empirical analysis is the impact of market thickness on
the outsoucing decision. I have measured market thickness on three levels, the ﬁrm’s 4-
digits industry, the ﬁrm’s 2-digits industry and the other industries. I have created three
variables of market thickness, the ﬁrst one, "MarketThickness-4", corresponds to the total
employment in the same 4-digits industry excluding the ﬁrm’s employees. The second one,
"MarketThickness-2", corresponds to the total employment in the same 2-digits industry ex-
cluding employment in the ﬁrm’s 4-digits industry and the third one, "MarketThickness-
Upstream" corresponds to the total employment in the remaining manufacturing industries.
10I have also controlled for other elements at the ﬁrm and industry levels. At the ﬁrm level, I
have added the average wage deﬁned as the ratio of the wage bill over the number of employ-
ees and have took into account the ﬁrm’s afﬁliation to a group as well as the nationality of the
group (foreign vs domestic). Information on group afﬁliation are from the Financial Liaisons
"LIFI" survey. The "LIFI" survey is realized annually by the French national statistic ofﬁce
"INSEE". It covers ﬁnancial links between ﬁrms, identiﬁes the ﬁrm’s afﬁliation to a group,
and gives the identity of the parent ﬁrm as well as its country of origin. I have created two
dummy variables, the ﬁrst one "group" takes the value one if the ﬁrm is a member of a group
and zero otherwise while the second one "foreign" takes the value one if the group is foreign
and zero otherwise. At the industry level, I have controlled for the presence of economies of
scale. Since the, assumed, production function corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas function of
output in labor, capital and intermediates and it is estimated in natural logarithm, economies
of scale are calculated as the sum of the estimated coefﬁcients on labor, capital and interme-
diates.
Table 1 presents a comparison based on a mean difference test between outsourcing and
non-outsourcing ﬁrms in each year over all sectors. Table 1 shows that a large number of
ﬁrms, in the French manufacturing industries, are engaged in outsourcing relationships. Al-
most 85% of ﬁrms are outsourcers. This share has been relatively steady in the time period
covered by the survey. Even though a large share of ﬁrms contract-out some of their produc-
tion, the share of output that is outsourced is relatively small (between 8 and 9%).10 Table 1
shows that, in all the years in the data set, outsourcing ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more produc-
tive, larger and pay higher wages than non-outsourcing ﬁrms.
Table 2 displays the comparison of ﬁrm characteristics within each sector of activity (follow-
ing the 2-digits French classiﬁcation) for all years. Similarly to the annual analysis, It shows
that, within each sector, a large share of ﬁrms (75 to 90%) outsource part of their production.
The share of contracted-out production in the total output differs across industries. It is only
of 4% in the wood and paper industry or 5.5% in the mineral products industry but 11% in
the sector of energy, 12% in the mechanical equipment industry or 13% in the printing and
publishing industry. The results from table 2 conﬁrm that, within each sector, outsourcing
ﬁrms are, on average, signiﬁcantly more productive, larger and pay higher wages than non-
11outsourcing ones.11 The "outstanding" performance of ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing is an
indicator of the link between ﬁrm heterogeneity and the outsourcing activity.
5 Results
The information I have on the outsourcing activity does not allow me to determine if the
outsourcing relationships are within the boundaries of a group or not. The organization of
relationships with afﬁliated ﬁrms may differ from that with independent ones. Risks of mal-
adaptation and of opportunistic behavior may be lower when both partners are governed
by the same parent company. Moreover, afﬁliated ﬁrms face lower search costs because they
have a privileged contact with other afﬁliates of the same group as well as an access to the net-
work of specialized suppliers connected to the group. For this reason, and in order to verify
the existence of differences in the outsourcing behavior between afﬁliated ﬁrms and others, I
have split the sample in two sub-samples one for ﬁrms member of a group and the other for
single ﬁrms.
Table 3 reports the results from the Heckman’s estimator of equation 2 while table 4 presents
results from a random effects probit estimator. Table 5 reports the marginal effects based on
the random effects probit model and estimated at the sample mean values. Columns 1 and 2 ,
of each table, display results based on the entire sample whereas column 3 contains results of
the estimations based on the sub-sample of unafﬁliated ﬁrms and column 4 results are those
of estimations based on the sub-sample of afﬁliated ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst point of interest of the empirical investigation is the presence of sunk costs asso-
ciated with the outsourcing activity. The Heckman estimator (table 3) as well as the random
effects probit model (table 4) bring evidence on the persistence of the outsourcing strategy.
As expected, the coefﬁcient on the lagged outsourcing variable is over estimated with the
random effects probit estimator. Both tables show that the present outsourcing decision sig-
niﬁcantly depends on past outsourcing behavior. This persistence reveals the existence of
sunk costs related to outsourcing. The average partial effects (APE) of the lagged depended
variable as well as the predicted probability ratio (PPR), reported at the bottom of table 3,
reﬂect the magnitude of the state dependence of outsourcing. These two indicators show that
12ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing in year t-1 have a 1.27 higher probability to outsource in year t
than the others.
When I distinguish between afﬁliated and non-afﬁliated ﬁrms, I ﬁnd that the degree of state
dependence is slightly lower in the case of ﬁrms afﬁliated to a group. The average partial
effect of the previous outsourcing status is of 0.17 in the case of afﬁliated ﬁrms and of 0.2 in
the case of non-afﬁliated ones. Furthermore, the predicted probability ratio is of 1.22 for afﬁli-
ated ﬁrms and of 1.28 for non-afﬁliated ones. As mentioned earlier, afﬁliation to a group may
lower the organizational and search costs associated with outsourcing. Firms facing lower
sunk costs do not need to persist in their outsourcing activity, thus showing a lower degree of
state dependence.
The persistent aspect of the outsourcing activity has been neglected by the economic litera-
ture. To my knowledge, only two other papers have introduced past outsourcing activity as
a determinant of present outsourcing decisions. The ﬁrst is the Girma and Görg (2004) study
which is based on three U.K. manufacturing industries: chemical, electronic, mechanical and
instrument engineering industries for the period 1982-1992. Girma and Görg (2004) focus on
the intensity of the outsourcing activity, measured as the ratio of the cost of industrial services
over the total wage bill and ﬁnd that past outsourcing activities have a negative and signiﬁ-
cant effect on present outsourcing. The second is the Díaz-Mora and Triguero (2007) analysis
of the outsourcing decision by Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms. They ﬁnd a positive and signif-
icant impact of past outsourcing on current outsourcing decision however they do not con-
trol for ﬁrm heterogeneity and do not consider the problems of serial correlation, unobserved
ﬁxedeffectsandinitialconditionsrelatedtotheestimationofdynamicdiscretechoicemodels.
The second point of interest in this paper is the link between ﬁrm heterogeneity and the
outsourcing behavior. The presence of signiﬁcant sunk costs associated with outsourcing sug-
gests that only more efﬁcient ﬁrms will engage in this strategy.
The results in tables 3 and 4 conﬁrm that more productive ﬁrms and larger ones are more
likely to contract-out production. The productivity of ﬁrms has a positive and signiﬁcant im-
pact on the probability of outsourcing. Firm scale also has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on
outsourcing. As discussed earlier, ﬁrm size may have two opposite effects on the outsourcing
decision. A positive effect through the reduction of per-unit costs of search, matching and
13organization of vertical relationships and a negative one through the presence of economies
of scale. The results suggest that the ﬁrst effect, the positive one, is more substantial. The
positive and signiﬁcant effect of TFP and scale holds when we control for group afﬁliation.
When I distinguish between afﬁliated and non afﬁliated ﬁrms, the coefﬁcient on both vari-
ables remain positive and signiﬁcant. However, the marginal effect of scale, reported in table
5 is lower for afﬁliated ﬁrms (0.014 compared to 0.03 in the case of non-afﬁliated ﬁrms). This
result conﬁrms the previous ﬁnding of lower sunk costs in the case of afﬁliated ﬁrms. To my
knowledge, no evidence of the impact of ﬁrm heterogeneity on outsourcing has been docu-
mented in the empirical literature. Girma and Görg (2004) and Díaz-Mora and Triguero (2007)
consider the impact of ﬁrm scale and ﬁnd a positive and a non signiﬁcant effect respectively.
However, they considered ﬁrm size as an indicator of the economies of scale and not of het-
erogeneity. I am not aware of any other paper considering the impact of ﬁrm productivity on
the outsourcing activity. All the studies analyzing the link between outsourcing and produc-
tivity focus on the impact of outsourcing on productivity (Görg et al., 2007).
The third point of interest of this analysis is the inﬂuence of market thickness on the out-
sourcing decision. The results conﬁrm the expectations that higher market thickness in up-
stream industriesincreases the probabilityof outsourcing by downstream ﬁrms. Thepresence
of a large number of suppliers reduces search costs, raises the probability of a match, and en-
hances the proﬁtability of outsourcing relationships.
Market thickness in the ﬁrm’s own industry, at the 4-digit level, also have a positive impact
on the probability of outsourcing. A larger number of ﬁrms in the same area of specialization
of ﬁrm i, increases the outside option of specialized suppliers providing inputs to this area of
specialization and favors entry by these specialized suppliers. Thus, at a disaggregated level,
the positive effect of market thickness, through the attraction of suppliers, offset the negative
effect caused by the higher competition for suppliers services. Market thickness at the ﬁrm’s
2-digit industry has no signiﬁcant effect on the outsourcing decision. At a more aggregated
level, the degree of specialization of ﬁrms diverges and the effect on the suppliers outside
option is weakened. It is worth noting that the market thickness variables are not signiﬁcant
in the case of afﬁliated ﬁrms as reported by column 4 in tables 3 and 4. Afﬁliated ﬁrms seem
to beneﬁt from the network of suppliers associated to the group as well as from privileged
14relationships with other ﬁrms within group. They face lower search costs and are less affected
by the availability of independent suppliers and by the thickness of the market.12 Just as for
ﬁrm heterogeneity, this empirical analysis is the ﬁrst, to my knowledge, to bring evidence on
the determining role of market thickness on the outsourcing decision at the ﬁrm level.
Tables 3 and 4 display other results of interest. The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on
the "group" variable indicates that being a member of group favors outsourcing for the rea-
sons mentioned earlier. However, the origin of the parent company has no signiﬁcant effect
on the afﬁliates outsourcing decision. The variable, Foreign, indicating whether the ﬁrm is af-
ﬁliated to a foreign group or to a domestic one, has no signiﬁcant impact on the probability to
outsource. Furthermore, ﬁrms paying higher wages have a higher probability of outsourcing.
The average wage variable indicates either the variable costs of the ﬁrm or the productivity
of its labor force. In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms paying higher wages will seek the outsourcing of
some of their activities to lower their variable costs and substitute supplier services to their
labor force (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). In the second case, labor productivity is another in-
dicator of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The positive sign on the average wage variable can therefor be
interpreted as a positive impact of productivity on the probability of outourcing. Finally, in
industries with a high level of economies of scale, ﬁrms seem to have a greater probability of
outsourcing. In these industries, ﬁrms seek a higher level of specialization in order to beneﬁt
from economies of scale. Hence, they tend to outsource some of their production process and
focus on their main activity.
6 Conclusion
Is outsourcing a recurrent strategy? Is it associated with substantial sunk entry costs? Are
ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing relationships subject to state dependence and do their hetero-
geneity affects their decision to outsource? The empirical analysis presented in this paper
tend to answer these questions on the basis of a data set of French manufacturing ﬁrms for
the period 1990-2001.
15Domestic and international outsourcing are becoming a widely adopted strategies among
ﬁrms and it is important to understand what are the economic motivations driving these
strategies. The decision to outsource corresponds to a "Make or Buy" choice and is discussed
in details by the literature on the ﬁrm’s scope. This literature puts forward the governance
and inefﬁciency costs associated with vertical integration and maladaptation costs, hold-up
and underinvestment problems and opportunistic behavior risks that may occur under out-
sourcing (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Joskow, 2005). More recently, McLaren
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) have added new aspects to the ﬁrm’s organization
theory by allowing the strategic interaction between the ﬁrms’ governance decisions and the
endogenization of the outsourcing strategy.
The empirical analysis, presented in this paper, particularly focuses on the presence of sig-
niﬁcant sunk costs of outsourcing. These costs result from the necessity to search and ﬁnd
a partner, to write and enforce contracts, to monitor and control the input’s production and
to exchange technology and knowledge with the partner. Due to the presence of these costs,
ﬁrms may want to make outsourcing a long term strategy. The presence of substantial sunk
costs puts forward the question of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Not all ﬁrms can afford paying these
sunk costs and, thus, only more efﬁcient ones will adopt the outsourcing strategy. Since some
of the outsourcing sunk costs are related to the matching process (searching and ﬁnding a
partner), I have also considered, in this paper, the impact of market thickness on the out-
sourcing decision.
I have analyzed the outsourcing strategy through the estimation of a dynamic probit
model where the current outsourcing decision dependes on the past outsourcing status. In
this purpose, I have applied the Heckman’s estimator (Heckman, 1981c) to control for the ini-
tial condition problem and serial correlation issues associated with dynamic discrete choice
models with unobserved ﬁxed effects (Heckman, 1981a,b; Wooldridge, 2001). In addition to
past outsourcing status I have controlled for ﬁrm heterogeneity, represented by the ﬁrm’s
TFP and its scale, for market thickness measured as the number of employees in upstream
and downstream industries as well as for a set of control variables at the ﬁrm and industry
levels.
16The results show a signiﬁcant presence of sunk costs and a persistence in the outsourcing
strategy. Outourcing in the previous year increases, by 1.27%, the probability of outsourcing
in the current year. The signiﬁcance of sunk costs is also revealed through ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Both productivity and scale raise the probability of outsourcing. I have found that market
thickness, especially in upstream industries enhances the outsourcing strategy. The avail-
ability of specialized suppliers increases the probability of a match and reduces search costs
raising thereby the proﬁtability of outsourcing.
The contribution of this analysis is, ﬁrst to present evidence on the determinant of the out-
sourcing strategy on the basis of a large panel of ﬁrms covering several industries. A large
share of the empirical literature on the "Make or Buy" decision consists of case studies con-
sidering a single ﬁrm or a single industry (Klein, 2005). Second, it focuses on new elements of
the ﬁrm’s organization theory such as the market thickness and ﬁrm heterogeneity and brings
evidence on the signiﬁcant implications of these elements on the outsourcing decision.
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20Notes
1 This methodology is similar to the one used by Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard
and Jensen (2004) to analyze the export decision and to test for the presence of sunk costs,
related to the export behavior, in the case of a panel of Colombian plants and U.S. plants
respectively.
2 Jabbour (2008) analyzes the offshoring strategy by French ﬁrms and show that ﬁxed
costs of organization are higher under international outsourcing (in comparison to vertical
FDI) and that the prevalence of outsourcing increases with the productivity of ﬁrms.
3 I have measured the ﬁxed costs by the ﬁrm’s stock of ﬁxed assets. I have created the
curves in table 2 by cumulating the distribution of ﬁxed assets expressed in natural logarithm.
4 The expected proﬁt of a specialized supplier (ﬁnal good producer) grows with the num-
ber of specialized ﬁnal good producers (suppliers) and decreases with the number of special-
ized suppliers (ﬁnal good producers).
5 Zit includes a ﬁrm subscript because the market thickness variables vary at the ﬁrm level.
6 I include in X0
i1 all independent variables except for TFP, at the ﬁrm and industry levels,
evaluated in the ﬁrst year of the sample. The results are robust to the inclusion of TFP in the
X0
i1 vector.
7 In the case where  = 0 initial conditions are considered exogenous.
8 Stewart (2006) has developed a STATA program, "redprob", for the Heckman’s estimator
of the dynamic random effects probit model where the integral over , in equation 5, is
evaluated using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature (Stewart, 2007). The estimations presented in
this study are realized with the "redprob" program.
9 All monetary variables are expressed in thousands of French francs and deﬂated using
sectoral price indices.
10 It is important to note that the annual ﬁrm survey covers relatively large ﬁrms. It covers
21around 20% of the number of manufacturing ﬁrms, small ﬁrms being very numerous. How-
ever it covers around 80% of the employment in the manufacturing industries. Thus, the
share of ﬁrms engaged in outsourcing is overestimated since, as shown in the next section,
the scale is an important determinant of the outsourcing strategy.
11 These results hold for all industries except for the energy sector.
12 As a robustness check, I have calculated the market thickness variables using the number
of ﬁrms instead of the number of employees and the results were similar to those presented
here. I consider that the measure of market thickness based on the number of employees is
better. As mentioned earlier, the EAE survey is more representative of the industry in terms
of number of employees than in terms of number of ﬁrms.
22Figure 1: Transition In and Out of Outsourcing




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 3: Determinants of the Outsourcing Strategy: The Heckman’s Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outsourcing last year 1.12 1.12 1.07 1.252
(0.017) (0.017) (0.02) (0.05)
TFP 0.293 0.271 0.237 0.553
(0.06) (0.06) (0.067) (0.22)
Scale 0.295 0.265 0.256 0.251
(0.01) (0.011) (0.015) (0.21)
Average Wage 0.22 0.213 0.229 0.205
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.072)
Economies of Scale 1.87 1.9 1.43 4.86
(0.61) (0.61) (0.69) (1.8)
Market Thickness-4 0.066 0.067 0.09 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.012) (0.026)
Market Thickness-2 –0.053 –0.056 –0.088 0.246
(0.07) (0.067) (0.08) (0.17)
Market Thickness-Upstream 2.48 2.44 2.84 2.53





No. of obs 267139 267139 197981 69158
Log Likelihood –46047.14 –46011.77 –35675.03 –5830.7
Wald Chi2 8590.16 8694.45 5668.6 1282.17
 0.391 0.39 0.411 0.38
 1.004 1.004 0.961 1.1
APE 0.2 0.11 0.2 0.17
PPR 1.27 1.13 1.28 1.22
In all regressions I have controlled for industry and time ﬁxed effects. ,  and  represent
respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
27Table 4: Determinants of the Outsourcing Strategy: Random Effects Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outsourcing last year 1.340 1.339 1.343 1.623
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030)
TFP 0.249 0.228 0.176 0.478
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.098)
Scale 0.275 0.246 0.230 0.222
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Average Wage 0.205 0.194 0.209 0.139
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.034)
Economies of Scale 2.031 2.050 1.763 3.259
(0.477) (0.477) (0.532) (1.045)
Market Thickness-4 0.058 0.059 0.072 0.025
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Market Thickness-2 –0.031 –0.035 –0.079 0.085
(0.058) (0.058) (0.067) (0.113)
Market Thickness Other 1.633 1.587 1.820 0.479





No. of obs 192009 192009 133219 58790
Log Likelihood –49590.06 –49547.72 –38591.017 –11082.48
Wald Chi2 15517.03 15650.98 11688.29 5159.00
In all regressions I have controlled for industry and time ﬁxed effects. ,  and  represent
respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
28Table 5: Determinants of the Outsourcing Strategy: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outsourcing last year 0.282 0.282 0.320 0.315
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
TFP 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.031
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Scale 0.029 0.025 0.031 0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Average Wage 0.021 0.020 0.028 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Economies of Scale 0.211 0.212 0.234 0.209
(0.050) (0.049) (0.071) (0.067)
Market Thickness-4 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Thickness-2 –0.003 –0.004 –0.010 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Market Thickness Other 0.169 0.164 0.242 0.031





No. of obs 192009 192009 133219 58790
In all regressions I have controlled for industry and time ﬁxed effects. ,  and  represent
respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
29